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having said to have been possibly in the wild 
since 2003. Today, all activities in digital realm 
are at the risk of being compromised by 
malicious actors aiming at perpetrating theft, 
impersonation, sabotage or to paralyze others’ 
activities for personal benefit.  
The consequences of such malicious 
activities for the unsuspecting user have also 
become more detrimental, persistent and 
having far reaching effects in that they are 
largely untraceable and easily invisible to the 
untrained eye. Developing novel and 
innovative methods that enable malicious 
activities to remain effectively undetected and 
untraceable, is the hallmark of these evildoers. 
They are almost always one step ahead of the 
pursuers. Furthermore, it is relatively easy to 
hide among the deluge of data that is created 
among communication devices that support 
the basic network communication on the 
internet. Malevolent activity in the “Digital 
Realm” can thus, easily become rampant and 
uncontrollable if there are no equally 
innovative methods to counter the offending 
actors and their activities. The rate of 
innovation and uptake of novel techniques by 
law enforcement agencies, digital forensics 
practitioners and incident responders must at 
the very least be equivalent to that of their 
criminal counterparts, if they are to keep up 
with the proliferation of crime on the Internet. 
One of the foremost areas in digital crime 
investigations where innovative means of 
combatting crime are highly necessary, but 
largely lacking, is the evidence capture process. 
This is the initial stage of an investigation 
where artifacts from the scene of the crime 
need to be retrieved in their original form, or, 
in the case of digital investigations, in some 
form of a complete copy of the original artifact 
that can be proven to be devoid of any 
tampering (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2004) (Scientific Working Group 
on Digital Evidence (SWGDE), 2006). This 
process needs to be performed meticulously, 
carefully and in many cases slowly in order to 
ensure that there is no potentially crucial piece 
of evidence left behind. This is the state of 
affairs in the real physical world. 
However, today’s crime scene is rapidly 
edging away from a physical reality into a 
more virtual one. The forms of evidence found 
in these “Digital Crime Scenes” have also 
moved from the traditional fingerprints, 
footprints, hair samples, blood samples or 
other DNA related evidence, into more digital 
artifacts.. Such digital forms of evidence 
commonly include hard-disk drives, live 
(RAM) memory, network traffic captures, 
mobile devices, RAID sets (M. Cohen, 
Garfinkel, & Schatz, 2009), and virtually any 
other form of technology that records past 
events of its actions; that can be captured and 
can be analyzed during or after the criminal 
event and whose integrity can be verified.  
This opens the floor to almost any form of 
computer appliance (physical or virtual) that 
can be thought of. Thus arises the 
heterogeneity problem among devices – or 
simply put the seeming lack of standardization 
among vendors of devices that perform related 
tasks. Different devices may have different 
physical connectors, operating systems, 
software applications, storage formats, 
encoding schemes and communication 
protocols (CDESF Working Group, 2006). This 
heterogeneity makes the job of a Digital 
Investigator a lot more difficult because of the 
wide variety in which evidence could manifest 
itself in the wild. This greatly hampers any 
manual efforts of collecting evidence, even with 
the assistance of semi-automated tools of today 
such as disk imagers.  
In addition to this, Electronic Crime cases 
today often involve more than just a single 
device. Several computer-like appliances 
including tablets, mobile phones, digital 
cameras, GPS devices, smart-TV’s and even 
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embedded devices such as onboard vehicle 
computer systems (from trucks, cars and even 
ships) could be seized for a single case, in order 
to be subjected to further investigative 
analysis. If we also bring in the vast realm of 
the Internet also into play, such evidence 
sources could include web application accounts, 
online email accounts, cloud storage facilities, 
network traffic captures and logs (Raghavan, 
Clark, & Mohay, 2009). It is not difficult to 
imagine that all these evidence forms could 
easily be part of a single case in today’s world 
and even more so in the imminent realm of the 
Internet of Things. The sheer volume of data 
that one would have to sift through in order to 
investigate a single case could be in the order 
of Terabytes and can be a more than daunting 
task to perform. (Case, Cristina, Marziale, 
Richard, & Roussev, 2008) 
Furthermore, in the realm of the Internet, 
composed of massively interconnected devices 
sharing vast amounts of highly varying data, 
crossing paths at high velocities, the speed of 
the capture of potentially evidentiary 
information is of essence. The same levels of 
meticulousness and carefulness of physical 
evidence acquisition may as well be sacrificed 
to some extent for the agility that is needed in 
reacting to crime in the digital world. This is 
because potentially evidentiary information 
that is not captured almost instantaneously, is 
likely to be lost forever in just a matter of 
seconds. However, this does not mean that all 
accuracy and care in collection of digital 
evidence artifacts is ignored, rather it is 
traded-off and reduced in favour of speed. 
Nevertheless, the maintenance of the chain of 
custody is always very important in any digital 
investigation. New methods of achieving 
similar standards of the preservation of digital 
evidence to those of physical evidence also 
need to be sought after and integrated into 
legal standards.  
Finally, at present, investigators grapple 
with the problem of the relatively immature 
forensic tools that they are presented with. 
Current industry standard forensic tools such 
as EnCase, FTK, XRY, Volatility and 
Wireshark, at the moment of writing, do not 
cater for the highly divergent nature of digital 
evidence sources. Most tools focus on a single 
niche area such as Filesystem Data, Live 
Memory, Network Traffic, Mobile Devices or 
Log data. Some have recently begun to expand 
their capabilities. The latest version of Encase 
Enterprise v7 (Guidance Software, 2014) 
claims to acquire evidence from disk drives as 
well as RAM and some mobile devices within 
an organizational context. AccessData’s FTK 
AD Enterprise (AccessData, 2014) also claims 
largely similar functionality. Neither deals with 
network traffic data yet. They are also yet to 
provide a comprehensive method to interface 
with all the variety of data present to provide 
a uniform investigation platform. In addition 
to this, current tools have rather limited 
capabilities for capturing potentially 
evidentiary data on demand over networks as 
well as dealing with extremely large datasets. 
Both EnCase and FTK products in their latest 
releases seem to allow for remote evidence 
acquisition within an enterprise network, 
however the performance of these are unknown 
and the tools proprietary, thus difficult to 
measure. Furthermore, most of such tools 
would struggle and would quickly become 
problematic when presented with Internet-
Scale crime scenes. 
In this paper, we present the architecture 
of a scalable, distributed, multi-component 
incident response and digital investigation 
platform aimed at dealing with large scale 
distributed cybercrime investigations. We 
name this system the Live Evidence 
Information Aggregator, or LEIA, in short. 
The LEIA architecture aims at curbing 
cybercrime through assisting digital forensics 
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the data. This has previously been done 
through “Known File Filtering” as well as 
through scripts crafted to use heuristics 
(Koopmans & James, 2013). Network Security 
Monitoring has also been an avenue for 
gathering data with the help of Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS’s) assisted through 
data mining (Leu & Yang, 2003). However, 
this has been the specific mandate of the IDS, 
centralized or distributed, as the case may be, 
with terminating (end) devices or intermediary 
devices generally playing very minor roles in 
this task. 
As far as is known to the author, there has 
not been much done, through any single 
initiative, in terms of expanding the scope of 
data captured to be the mandate of all possible 
devices of reasonable capability. Enabling 
individual devices to natively act as part of the 
Incidence Response System, towards the aim of 
collecting potential evidentiary data, has not 
been widely studied. Additionally, 
collaboration on the human processing level 
has been emphasized, but it has not been 
introduced among unrelated networked 
devices. These devices could possibly be 
harnessed to work together towards aiding in 
intelligent real-time capturing, filtering and 
processing in order to attain and retain that 
which could be considered as possible 
evidentiary data, antecedent to the event of a 
crime being detected. It is for these reasons 
that we delve into this area to explore it 
further. 
Notable related studies include (Zonouz, 
Joshi, & Sanders, 2011), that describes a live 
network forensics system that provisions 
varying Intrusion Detection Systems on host 
machines based on their respective resource 
costs. It works in a virtualized environment 
where snapshots are taken periodically and 
used to revert the system back to the point 
before an attack began. Each system rollback 
results in different IDSs being deployed to 
collect new and possibly better information. 
This presupposes that the attacker re-enacts 
their malicious behavior in a similar way to 
their previous attempts, each time their efforts 
are thwarted by the system. Storage of the 
potential evidentiary information in a 
forensically sound manner is not particularly 
dealt with in this study. The aim was to 
understand attacks better in order to make 
better decisions on what kind of preventive 
measures to deploy. 
The RAFT system (Scanlon & Kechadi, 
2010) proposed an architecture for performing 
remote evidence acquisition from disks of 
computers using a live CD prepared with disk 
acquisition tools and networking capabilities. 
One of the drawbacks of this system was the 
inability to take live captures of the disk thus 
requiring the machine to be rebooted as well as 
needing a CD Drive or a USB port. The 
remote acquisition was also seen to suffer from 
speed deficiencies and a need was identified to 
improve on this. We extend on this idea but 
oriented towards mobile devices. (Scanlon, 
Farina, Khac, & Kechadi, 2014) further also 
describe a methodology for performing 
forensics on devices participating in 
decentralized cloud storage services such as 
BitTorrent Sync. They show how the default 
replication of data on multiple devices can help 
in recovering data despite it having been 
maliciously removed to hinder forensic 
analysis. 
(Shields, Frieder, & Maloof, 2011), (Yu et 
al., 2005), (M. I. Cohen, Bilby, & Caronni, 
2011), and (Moser & Cohen, 2013) describe 
distributed system architectures for proactive 
collection and summarization of evidence, with 
centralized data storage and processing. They 
are, however, particularly directed at closed 
domain enterprise systems, where there is some 
form of control and order instigated by system 
administrators. Participation of computer 
systems outside the control of the enterprise is 
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not considered. The system being proposed in 
this study is aimed at being universal – 
applying to the entire Internet.  
The work done by Redding in (Redding, 
2005) is the most closely related study done in 
the area of pro-active and collaborative 
computer forensic analysis among 
heterogeneous systems. Redding proposes a 
peer-to-peer framework for network monitoring 
and forensics through which network security 
events can be collected and shared among the 
peers. “Analysis, forensic preservation and 
reporting of related information can be 
performed using spare CPU cycles,” (Redding, 
2005) together with other spare, under-utilized, 
or unused resources. This system however 
seems to be designed to collect only network 
security events and not any other forms of 
evidence from individual host devices 
Furthermore it seems to be aimed towards an 
“administratively closed environment” under 
the control of some systems administrator 
within an enterprise. An open system that has 
the Internet as its domain of operation 
assisting in the collection of any form of 
computer based evidence is what is not dealt 
with in Redding’s work. Thus, it is this that is 
sought after in the current study as will be 
described later in this paper. 
In order to facilitate uniform, seamless 
exchange of forensic artifacts between 
heterogeneous entities, some form of 
standardization of the transmitted evidence 
formats is necessary. One of the bodies that 
has made proposals related to this is the 
Common Digital Evidence Storage Format 
Working Group (CDESF Working Group, 
2006). Other notable efforts include (Schatz & 
Clark, 2006) which makes use of the Resource 
Description Framework (RDF) from Semantic 
Web technologies as a common data 
representation layer for digital evidence related 
metadata, using ontologies for describing the 
vocabulary related to this data, and 
(Kahvedžić & Kechadi, 2009) where a detailed 
ontology of Windows Registry artifacts of 
interests is introduced. The Open Forensic 
Integration Architecture (FIA) in (Raghavan 
et al., 2009) and FACE (Case et al., 2008) 
describe methods for the integration of digital 
evidence from multiple evidence sources in a 
bid to facilitate more efficient analysis. The 
Advanced Forensic Format (Garfinkel, 2006), 
AFF4 (M. Cohen et al., 2009) and XIRAF 
(Alink, Bhoedjang, Boncz, & de Vries, 2006) 
describe annotated evidence storage formats 
that allow for addition of arbitrary metadata 
as well as interoperability among different 
tools.  
In AFF4  (M. Cohen et al., 2009), notably, 
remote evidence capture, some form of  
availability through manually driven 
redundancy, and some parallelism in the 
evidence capture process of RAID data sets is 
also present. However it seems that the 
initiation of these processes is instigated 
through human intervention. They are not 
fully automated through machine triggers, and 
thus could be slow to react in acquiring 
evidence. The availability (fail-over) provided 
through redundancy is based on whether the 
evidence captured is required in other 
locations. If it is not required elsewhere, then 
the fail-over mechanism would not work 
because there would be only one copy of the 
evidence. The parallelism (described 
particularly for acquiring individual disks in a 
RAID set) is unclear whether it could also 
apply in parallelizing other potential evidence 
data sources such as RAM memory or NAND 
storage on mobile devices. 
The proposed idea that this study covers is 
composed of several areas of specialization, 
namely: The Internet of Things (IoT), 
Intrusion Detection Systems, Peer to Peer 
Networks, Virtualization infrastructures, Large 
Scale Cloud storage and Semantic Web 
technologies. Most of these technologies have 
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information, or transmit potentially large 
evidence files towards more reliable and stable 
peers. It is assumed that nodes with more 
resources are more likely to be better equipped 
to deal with larger amounts of information and 
are also more likely to be online and available 
to be communicated with. 
A gradient overlay network is suited to 
ensure this form of a network structure. It is 
built in such a way that a utility metric is used 
to determine which nodes are most suitable to 
connect to, and which nodes to avoid. This 
utility metric is determined from a 
combination of factors including the amount of 
resources available on a node, the current state 
of use of the node and the amount of time that 
it has been online. These utility metrics are 
shared through random node interactions, 
typical of “gossip-based” (epidemic) P2P 
protocols in order for nodes to get to know of 
other nodes that might be better to link to. 
As gossip-based P2P protocols are known 
to eventually converge to a generally stable 
state, a hierarchy of the HbH systems is thus 
formed with the less endowed elements on the 
outer edges and the more capable elements 
closer towards the centre of the LEIA system 
(that is, the CBB). 
Mechanics of the Gossiping and Gradient 
Overlay 
Neighbour (peer) selection is an important 
process in maintaining both overlays. This is 
because it affects the performance of the 
gossiping overlay in its ability to communicate 
and converge, and thus also the gradient 
overlay. In order to be efficient in converging 
information across a network where random 
interaction is a key factor, each peer has to be 
equipped with good “local knowledge” as well 
as “distant knowledge”. In our case this would 
require each peer to have knowledge of both 
peers that are “nearby” as well as peers that 
are “distant”. The distance metric determining 
this distance could be simple Euclidean 
distance in terms the difference between the 
utility metrics of devices, or some other useful 
sense of distance, such as the geographic 
distance. Thus each peer should store 
information of “nearby” devices termed as the 
similar set, consisting of devices with similar 
utility metrics; as well as a set of devices which 
are distant in terms of the utility metric, 
termed as the “random set”. This mix of 
nearby and distant peer knowledge would also 
assist in preventing partitioning of the network 
due to excessive clustering. 
For the gradient overlay to be maintained, 
each peer should also maintain information 
about a set of peers that has “weaker” utility 
metrics and a set that has “stronger” utility 
metrics. This is in done in order to maintain 
communication between peers where the 
hierarchy of the gradient is needed. Such is the 
case when a peer needs to pass on more 
computationally intensive tasks, or when 
ensuring that evidence is transported onward 
to a more stable peer. We term these lists the 
subordinate list and the superior list, 
respectively. 
These lists are exchanged among peers 
periodically and randomly. This means that a 
peer picks a peer either from its similar set or 
its random set and exchanges all or part of its 
subordinate and superior lists if they are 
different. Thresholds need to be set in order to 
ensure that the exchanges do not result in only 
a particular set of peer information being 
exchanged, however these thresholds are not 
further discussed in this study. Additionally, a 
list of “recently seen peers” should also be 
maintained in order to avoid cycling between 
the same peers repeatedly. 
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Figure 2: The P2P-da Data Transfer process 
 
a) Data Partitioning 
Different data formats (memory dumps, 
logs, files, packet captures, disk images) 
are compressed and stored temporarily 
on the HbH system in a modified AFF4 
data structure that also contains simple 
RDF metadata describing the evidence. 
This data structure is termed as the 
Incident Data Archive (IDA). Each 
IDA data structure is partitioned in 
equal size pieces that will be referred to 
as shards. The shard is a signed and 
encrypted partition of the IDA 
analogous to the idea of a “piece” in the 
BitTorrent Protocol. A metadata file 
termed as the “reflection” (which 
corresponds to the BitTorrent 
Metadata file) is also created and sent 
directly to the CBB. In this way the 
CBB acts as the “tracker” and “leeches” 
IDAs from participating HbH systems 
in the P2P-da, thus benefiting from the 
high throughput of the BitTorrent 
protocol 
b) Shard Distribution 
Multiple copies of each individual shard 
are distributed to more capable 
neighbors (supporters), facilitated by 
the gradient overlay. Each time a shard 
is passed on it increases its “heat level”. 
After a certain “heat” threshold (that 
we refer to as the “melting point”) a 
HbH system is obliged to directly 
upload to the CBB (more specifically 
the HbH Master Peers of the CBB), 
else an election procedure is initiated to 
determine which previously supporting 
HbH should be delegated the uploading 
task. In order to avoid an individual 
node being the only “proxy” and thus a 
potential single point of failure, 
individual HbH systems are only 
allowed to partake in uploading a 
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devices over the Internet and the subsequent 
reconstruction and storage of this data on a 
Hadoop HDFS cluster. The success rate of each 
evidence acquisition trial run was also 
considered to determine reliability. 
It should be mentioned that for the sake of 
simplicity of the experiment, the actual 
hypervisor of the HbH system was not built, 
however closely similar conditions – 
particularly in terms of the LEIA prototype 
application having privileged access – were 
met. In order to test and measure the 
performance of the proof of concept application 
working over the client-server paradigm, six 
different small scale devices were used. Two 
rounds of testing were performed: the first 
round with the first 4 less powerful devices, 
and the second round with the 2 more 
powerful devices. The table below outlines the 
specifications of the devices being captured. 
 
 
Table 1  
Small scale device specifications 
Device Platform Processor Chipset RAM Disk 






HTC Incredible S 

















Samsung Galaxy Tab 2 
(WiFi Only) 
Android OS, v4.0.3 
(Ice Cream Sandwich) 
Dual‐core 
1GHz 
TI OMAP 4430 1GB 8GB 
Samsung Galaxy S4 
LTE-A 
Android OS v 5.0.1 
(Lollipop) 
Quad-core 





Google Nexus 5 Android OS v 5.1.1
Quad-core 
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Figure 4. The experimental set up 
 
For the testing and the performance 
evaluation, partitions of the various devices 
were filled to specific size limits with random 
files, including images, PDFs, music files and 
compressed archive files (RARs) in order to 
simulate normal disk usage. These devices were 
subsequently captured over the network.  
In the first round, the capture process was 
repeated 10 times for each individual partition 
size on each device in order to get the average 
file transfer times that each size took. The 
sizes measured were taken at 9 intervals with 
gradually increasing sizes. The maximum size 
of 4GB was taken as the largest size because 
the average capture (file transfer) times were 
beginning to take rather long periods (50-80 
minutes) per test acquisition round. 
Furthermore, the maximum disk size on any of 
the devices available for testing was 8GB (with 
the rest being 4GB, 1.1GB and 64MB). A 4GB 
mini-SD card was also available and was used 
to supplement the HTC Incredible S in order 
to simulate a larger disk size. The Chumby 
Classic only had 64MB available of flash 
(NAND) memory, and no expansion 
capabilities, thus it was not included in the 
testing for remote data transfer performance as 
there was no way to increase the size of the 
storage capacity. It was, however, used in 
testing to show that the remote device capture 
of such a small scale device running on a Linux 
based platform was possible. It was also used 
as the main prototyping device because it had 
a rather small storage capacity that enabled 
rather quick disk acquisitions when testing the 
software developed. 
The repetition process and the use of the 
averaging were done in order to compensate for 
the effects of random processes that could have 
affected network transmission times. Such 
random processes could include network traffic 
from other users of the networks being used, 
phone calls coming in and interfering with the 
I/O processes of the devices, or applications 
being updated on the devices, among others. 
The tables below show the partition sizes 
used and the average times (in milliseconds) 
taken to perform the transfer:
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Table 2 
First Round Results – Tests on "HTC Incredible S" 
Partition 
Amount used # of Test Runs 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (ms) 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (Minutes) 
16MB 10 13664 0.23 
133MB 10 84600.8 1.41 
250MB 10 392323.9 6.54 
507MB 10 553933.1 9.23 
1000MB 10 978571.8 16.31 
1500MB 10 1360375 22.67 
2000MB 10 2932376.8 48.87 
3000MB 10 3877676.8 64.63 
4000MB 10 4814006.6 80.23 
 
Table 3 
First Round Results – Tests on "HTC MyTouch 4G Slide" 
Partition 
Amount Used 
# of Test Runs Avg. File Transfer 
time (ms) 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (Minutes) 
21.4MB 10 8583 0.14 
87.0MB 10 31467 0.52 
255MB 10 230709 3.85 
500MB 10 338180 5.64 
1000MB 10 1174482 19.57 
1550MB 10 1323845.90 22.06 
2000MB 10 1673928 27.90 
3000MB 10 2052952.40 34.22 
4000MB 10 3015056.60 50.25 
 
Table 4 
First Round Results – Tests on "Samsung Galaxy Tab 2" 
Partition 
Amount Used 
# of Test 
Runs 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (ms) 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (Minutes) 
4MB 10 1235 0.02 
11MB 10 67608 1.13 
250MB 10 286947 4.78 
500MB 10 426783 7.11 
1000MB 10 960952 16.02 
1500MB 10 1488236 24.80 
2000MB 10 2829355 47.16 
3000MB 10 2951551 49.19 
4000MB 10 3707556 61.79 
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The data above from three of the four 
different specimen devices used in the first 
round was plotted on a graph in order to 
visualize the general trend of the file transfer 
time against the partition size for the client 
server network paradigm of remote evidence 
acquisition. The diagram that follows depicts 
the graph that was attained: 
 
Figure 5. Remote Acquisition Performance from First Round of Tests using Client-Server paradigm 
In the second round of testing and 
performance evaluation the two most powerful 
and best equipped devices were tested. The 
process from round one was replicated, but 
now with larger partition sizes since these 2 
devices had larger disk storage capacity 
(16GB). It was noticed in the first round that 
capturing the larger partition sizes was not 
always successfully completed. In the first 
round, in order to collect 10 time duration 
values for the larger partition sizes, often more 
than 10 trial runs were required. Connection 
time-outs due to random failures either on the 
devices, the network, or on the server side were 
deemed to be the cause of failure. 
Thus in the second round it was 
determined that strictly 10 runs would be 
taken and an average of these would be the 
resulting estimated value. Among the 10 trial 
runs the number of successes and failures 
would be recorded. This would enable 
determining the average success rate for ever 
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The tables that follow indicate the 
partition size intervals and the respective time 
durations taken. The number of successes out 
of 10 trials per partition size is also indicated.
Table 5 
Second Round Results – Tests on "Samsung Galaxy S4" 
Partition 
Amount Used 
# of Successful 
Trials 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (Sec) 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (Minutes) 
263MB 10 275 4.58 
535MB 10 535 8.92 
1055MB 10 887 14.78 
2168MB 10 1735 28.92 
3221MB 10 2617 43.62 
4304MB 9 3358 55.97 
6470MB 6 5311 88.52 
8637MB 6 6953 115.88 
10247MB 5 8373 139.55 
12778MB 4 10472 174.53 
15758MB 3 13088 218.13 
 
Table 6 
Second Round Results – Tests on “Google Nexus 5” 
Partition 
Amount Used 
# of Successful 
Trials 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (Sec) 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (Minutes) 
263MB 10 270 4.50 
535MB 10 497 8.28 
1074MB 10 820 13.67 
2168MB 9 1780 29.67 
3221MB 10 2757 45.95 
4304MB 8 3526 58.77 
6470MB 5 5412 90.20 
8637MB 4 7119 118.65 
10247MB 2 9369 156.15 
12778MB 2 13001 216.68 
15758MB 2 15117 251.95 
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where the actual file is reconstructed. Other 
than the inherent re-transmission capabilities 
of the underlying TCP protocol, the proof of 
concept does not embody its own extra 
recovery method for transmission failures. 
Thus, if a network failure interrupts the 
streaming, a large file being reconstructed on 
the CBB end could be left incomplete. In the 
event the device being captured also goes 
offline, then the evidence may be irrecoverably 
lost in this Client-Server scenario. 
It should be noted, though, that storage 
failures were dealt with through the replication 
afforded by Hadoop HDFS that was managing 
the CBB backend filesystem. Thus, some form 
of availability and thus reliability was 
achieved, though only for evidence data 
successfully saved in storage at least once. 
From the results gathered in the test 
experiments we discover that larger partition 
sizes may not scale well in remote evidence 
acquisition depending on the capabilities of the 
device need. Additionally we do see that 
devices with better hardware could scale well 
with data sizes that proved problematic for less 
capable devices. Furthermore we see that for 
large partition sizes the remote acquisition 
times do increase to significantly long times 
(over 4hrs for >14GB), thus the likelihood of a 
failure occurring during these large durations 
increases. We postulate that the use of P2P 
networks, between the evidence capture 
location and the eventual storage location, 
could be used to assist in providing availability 
through replication of data at multiple peers, 
as well as better throughput through using the 
bandwidth of multiple peers to facilitate 
uploading of potential evidentiary data. 
Certain P2P overlays such as the BitTorrent 
protocol are known to provide better network 
throughput, and thus shorter latency times 
between evidence capture and storage. Others 
are known to provide high availability through 
replication of data at multiple peers thus 
reducing the problem of a single point of 
failure that may be experienced with mobile 
devices having intermittent network 
connectivity. This could also potentially 
increase the time-window in which evidence 
can be gathered aiding in the need for 
collecting as much evidence as possible in 
digital investigations.  
Smaller file sizes being transmitted over 
the network are seen to have a higher 
likelihood of succeeding, thus splitting up the 
larger partitions into smaller pieces before 
transmission may also help reduce failures. 
This is also a common trend in P2P overlay 
networks such as BitTorrent where large files 
are split into smaller pieces, thus furthering 
our hypothesis of using P2P overlays to help 
improve availability and network throughput. 
Another alternative paradigm that could assist 
in improving reliability of remote evidence 
capture would be to collect and transmit 
metadata of the activities occurring on various 
evidence sources (disk, memory or network) 
rather than transferring the entire evidence 
source. The metadata repositories are likely to 
be smaller in size and thus transferring and 
replicating these among peers during the 
remote evidence capture process, could prove 
to be more efficient through promoting the 
reliability seen in the transfer of smaller files. 
In determining the success rates of the 
remote evidence acquisition, it should be 
mentioned that only 10 trial runs were done 
per partition size because the evidence 
acquisition times were getting significantly 
longer. More than 10 trials proved to be 
inconvenient and a hindrance given the time 
constraints in performing this study. Ten trials 
were deemed to be good enough to show some 
form of indicative result, even though the 
value of 10 may not represent a statistically 
significant sample size to generalize the results 
as being fully representative of the 
phenomenon being analyzed. 
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